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ABSTRACT
The  need  for  a  supra  national  model  which  embraces  and  provides  for  social  rights  of 
individual Member States is becoming more apparent amidst the ever intensifying integration 
process  within  the  EU and  its  involvement  in  areas  which  have  been  undermined  by  an 
economic model.  This paper considers why, despite such a need for a supra national model, 
the “ordo liberal European polity” is favoured. It partly does so, by way of reference to two 
judgements from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – namely, Laval un Partneri Ltd , and 
the Viking Cases.
Can  competition  rules  (during  and  beyond  periods  of  financial  crises)  be  designed  and 
implemented in such a way whereby the facilitation of the aims and objectives of the EU 
Internal Market are optimally realised? To what extent can such rules be reconciled with the 
all paramount and more highly prioritised goal of sustaining economic and financial stability? 
Further,  to  what  extent  should  competition  rules  be  given  due  prominence  –  particularly 
during chronic periods of financial crises? To what extent should competition be encouraged 
(where  it  would  result  in  downward  spiral  and  generate  unproductive  and  detrimental 
results)  :  to  what  extent,  therefore,  should  competition  rules  (within  such  a  context)  be 
respected? These also constitute further questions which this paper seeks to address.
Key Words:  European Court  of  Justice  (ECJ);  integration;  competition;  regulation;  ordo-
liberalism; economic objectives; social rights; internal market; bank rescues
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Social Rights and Economic Objectives: The Importance of Competition at 
Supra National Level
Marianne Ojo1
I. Introduction
Competition and Economic Regulation
Competition it has been argued, is so important that it should be elevated from its status as a 
principle of financial regulation to a statutory objective of financial regulation. This is the 
view shared by some regarding the statutory objectives and principles of financial regulation 
in the United Kingdom. The rise of conglomeration over the past two decades, as well as 
globalisation  has  resulted  in  changes  to  the  structure  of  regulation  in  countries  such  as 
Germany, the UK, and Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden. With 
transnationalisation  of  standard  setting  processes  and  increased  harmonisation  between 
countries such as the US, the UK and Germany, in these standard setting processes, this has 
resulted in less role for the State and a greater role for supra national bodies. The traditional 
tool of deregulation as a means of fostering competition has therefore become inconceivable. 
As  a  result,  there  is  even  greater  need  to  promote  measures  which  would  facilitate 
competition.
However the priority accorded to the objective of ensuring financial stability – over that of 
fostering  competition  (as  well  as  the  extent  to  which  authorities,  such  as  the  European 
Commission, are prepared to facilitate measures aimed at fostering financial stability – even 
where these may still distort competition),2 highlights the prominence accorded to financial 
stability as an economic objective.  During the  recent global financial  crisis, it  was widely 
accepted that “a serious disturbance in the economy of Member States had occurred and that 
measures supporting banks are appropriate to remedy this disturbance”.3 
„In order to assist Member States to take urgent and effective measures to preserve stability 
and to provide legal certainty, between October 2008 and July 2009, the Commission adopted 
four Communications which provided direction on how State aid rules are to be applied to 
government  measures  to  support  the  financial  sector  within  the  context  of  the  Financial 
1Researcher, Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen, and Teaching Associate, 
Oxford Brookes University, Oxford.
2As evidenced by many rescue and State aid cases during the recent Financial Crisis.
3 “This having been confirmed in various  Commission communications such as  the Communication on the 
application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current  
global financial crisis(hereinafter "the Banking Communication"), its Communication on the re capitalisation of  
financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards  
against  undue  distortions  of  competition (hereinafter  "the  Re  capitalisation  Communication"),  and  its  
Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in 
the current crisis under the State aid rules (hereinafter "the Restructuring Communication").”In order to address 
continued uncertainty about  the value and location of  impaired assets  held by banks,  the Commission also 
adopted the Communication on the treatment  of  impaired assets  on February 25 2009.“ See also N Kroes, 
„Competition Policy and the Crisis – the Commission's Approach to Banking and Beyond“ February 2010 at 
page 4 of 7
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2010_1_1.pdf>
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Crisis.4 Various rescue cases - such as those of Bradford and Bingley5 and Hypo Real Estate6 
have confirmed  how far  the  European  Commission  is  willing  to  go  in  order  to  facilitate 
financial stability – even where competition may be distorted as a result.7
The Commission's resort to the „rarely used and more lenient provision of Article 87 (3)(b) 
EC  Treaty,  during  the  recent  Financial  Crisis,  to  authorise  national  recovery  plans  and 
individual rescue measures“8 is an explicit illustration of its committment to goals aimed at 
facilitating economic stability through the aversion of „a serious disturbance in the economy 
of  Member  States.“  Its  realisation  of  the need to  implement  this  provision occurred after 
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy9 – the first case to be decided under Article 87(3)(b) 
EC Treaty, being Bradford and Bingley.10
As well as the attention drawn (by key findings published by the OECD) to the controversy 
generated by some who argue that competition rules should be suspended for the duration of 
financial crises - thus allowing regulators to focus only on the objective of safeguarding the 
stability of the financial  system, these findings also conclude that,  whether competition is 
desirable at  all  when there is a systemic crisis,  is a matter  which generally,  is in need of 
clarification.11 
4N Kroes, „Competition Policy and the Crisis – the Commission's Approach to Banking and Beyond“ February 
2010 at page 3 of 7
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2010_1_1.pdf>
5European Commission, “State aid N 194/2009 –United Kingdom: Liquidation Aid to Bradford and Bingley Plc 
section 4 paragraph 44
6European Commission, „State aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 - Germany Hypo 
Real Estate – Extension of formal investigation procedure, and temporary find capital injections compatible“
7However emphasis is still directed at the need to minimise or avoid distortions of competition.
8See D Gerard, „Managing the Financial Crisis in Europe: Why Competition Law is Part of the Solution, Not of 
the Problem“ at page 6 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1330326
9„With respect to State aid law enforcement, the Commission also consistently refused to authorise measures 
pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty during the period prior to mid September 2008.“ The period from mid 
September 2008 being a point where it was realised that „the systemic turn was beginning to affect even 
fundamentally sound financial institutions.“ See ibid 
10In respect of Northern Rock, and with respect to the legal basis of the Commission's decisions, „the rescue 
decision and the decision of 2 April 2008 to open the formal investigation procedure, were taken on the basis of 
Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty and the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. The reason for this being that the 
Commission considered the difficulties faced by Northern Rock to be linked specifically to Northern Rock – 
therefore not justifying the application of Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty. As the severity of the Financial Crisis 
affected more and more banks, in September 2008, the Commission considered the application of Article 87 (3)
(b) EC Treaty, to banks that were in receipt of State aid, to be necessary thereafter. „
„Therefore the decision extending the formal investigation procedure and (ii) the final decision were 
taken on the basis of  Article 87 (3)(b) EC Treaty.“ See Z Didziokaite and M Gort, „Restructuring in the Banking 
Sector During the Financial Crisis: The Northern Rock Case“ at pages 3 and 4 of 6 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2010_1_18.pdf
11“Others have instead emphasised the importance of applying strict competition rules in the recent crisis as a 
means of ensuring a level playing field and a coordinated reaction to the crisis – as well as avoiding a futile race 
for subsidies between countries to attract depositors and investors. Moreover, the long-term effects of relaxing 
competition policy can  be  serious.  Mergers  that  lead  to  very concentrated  markets  in  particular  are  almost 
impossible to reverse.”; See  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the 
Financial Crisis” at page 12
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II. Addressing the Lack of a Socio-Economic Model at Supra National Level in the 
EU.
Social Rights and Economic Objectives
The facilitation of competition can be said to constitute one of the primary economic aims of 
the EU. According to  Article  2  of the Treaty Establishing  the European Community,  the 
establishment of a common market should facilitate a high degree of competitiveness and 
convergence of economic performance. Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty lists activities of the 
Community which include inter alia a system ensuring that competition in the internal market 
is not distorted. 
“The theory of ordo-liberalism, which influences politics to a great extent in Germany, bases 
the European model on a dual polity which did not require democratic legitimacy: At supra 
national  level,  it  aims  to  ensure  a  process  of  undistorted  competition  whilst  sustaining 
economic  rationality.12 At  national  level,  endeavours  are  to  be  made  to  further  the 
development of social policies.”
However, the need for a supra national model which embraces and provides for social rights 
of  individual  Member  States  is  becoming  more  apparent  amidst  the  ever  intensifying 
integration process within the EU and its involvement in areas which have been undermined 
by an economic model – namely, those involving social policies. The need for unity amidst 
increasing intensification of integration within the EU is also vital to ensure the administrative 
workability  of  functions  within  the  EU.  How  is  one  to  reconcile  the  aims  of  fostering 
competition  and  those  social  rights  such  as  those  aimed  at  ensuring  minimum  wage 
requirements?  The issue regarding  whether  an introduction  of  minimum wages  fosters  or 
hinders competition could be complex and different results emanate according to whether it is 
viewed from a supra national level or from a national level. As regards social rights, these 
also depend on whose social rights are in question. To illustrate using Laval13, whose rights 
carry more weight - those of the posted workers or those workers of the host state?
In  Laval,  the  Court  presented  as  a  social  right  (of  the  posted  workers),  the  universally 
guaranteed  higher  minimum wage  in  the  host  state.  That  unless,  employers  who are  not 
threatened by collective actions agree voluntarily to pay more than the local minimum wage, 
then  no  action  may  be  taken  by  a  union  of  the  host  state  in  order  to  extract  higher 
compensation  from  employers.14 However,  the  Posted  Workers  Directive  states  in  its 
preamble that where a conflict with established industrial relations occurs, the Directive must 
assume a subordinate position.15
12 C Jörges and F Rödl, ‘ On De-formalisation in European Politics and Formalism in European Jurisprudence in 
Response to the “Social Deficit” of the European Integration Project, Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ 
in Viking and Laval’ at page 5 <http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf6/Vol4No1Art01.pdf> 
13 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd, of 18 December 2007 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0341:EN:HTML>
14 In effect, established systems of industrial relations where trade unions are able to demand concessions that are 
more favourable for workers than that stipulated under statutory minimal standards are deemed, in principle, to 
be incompatible with EU Law. For more on this see A Somek, Idealisation, De-politicisation and Economic Due 
Process: System Transition In The European Union ) in “The Law/Politics Distinction in Contemporary Public 
Law Adjudication.” Edited by B Iancu, March 2009.
15 ibid
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Should values of these social rights be weighed against the values of free market access at 
supranational level? What authority/ies should determine those social rights which do and do 
not conflict with European economic objectives?
In the Viking Case16, the ECJ realigned the balance between economic freedoms at European 
level and social rights at national level with the pre-requisite that Member States comply with 
community law when exercising their authority in the field of labour law.17
The problem however, is that the Community is not authorised to regulate national industrial 
relations.18 The basic rights involved are not within the jurisdiction of the Community since 
Article 137 (5) EC expressly provides that “pay, the right of association, the right to strike or 
the right to impose lock-outs” are matters to be regulated by the Member States.19 “Not only 
did the Court accord an extremely extensive interpretation of European primary law (Article 
137 (5) EC in Viking, it also did likewise in interpreting European secondary law ( Directive 
96/71/EC) in Laval.20 Furthermore its interpretation of the Directive 96/71/EC in Laval, did 
not take into consideration vital elements of the Swedish social model.”21
III. Conclusion
The role assumed by the Commission in the recent Financial Crisis – particularly with regards 
to bank rescues, illustrates the extent to which economic and competition policies are now 
being managed at supranational level.
Social rights which exist at national level should be incorporated at EU level in so far as these 
do  not  severely  impede  or  hinder  competition.  Those  (social)  rights  which  conflict  with 
economic objectives of European economic integration should be determined according to the 
national  laws  of  the  Member  State/s  involved.  EU  legislation  should  stipulate  (where 
possible) those rights which do and do not conflict  with European economic objectives – 
hence  matters  to  be  decided  upon  by  national  courts  and  the  ECJ  respectively.  This  is 
however, a complicated task.
The ordo liberal European polity is therefore favoured in the sense that social rights which do 
not  conflict  with  economic  rationales  and the  aim of  facilitating  a  system of  undistorted 
competition should be recognised at supranational level.  Furthermore it is administratively 
16 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP 
and OÜ Viking Line Eesti 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0438:EN:HTML>
17 ibid 
18 ibid
19 ibid
20 See C Jörges and F Rödl, ‘ On De-formalisation in European Politics and Formalism in European 
Jurisprudence in Response to the “Social Deficit” of the European Integration Project, Reflections after the 
Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’ at page 5 
<http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf6/Vol4No1Art01.pdf> 
21 ibid
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unworkable for the ECJ alone to take into account all vital elements of every Member State’s 
social model. 
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